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Abstract
Who is He, to Whom we address words God, Theos, Deus, etc.? How far goes 
possibility for adaptation of religious and philosophical language from other 
(non-Western) cultures? Do  people, by  using certain words and terms, de-
note being of God, or are they just conventional names? Those questions were 
raised quite early in theological debates in early stages of Christianity, and an-
swers were given by such prominent Church Fathers as Gregory of Nyssa and 
Basil the Great. The problem resurfaced millennium later, when Western mis-
sionaries encountered nations and people whose religious and philosophical 
concepts were far different from their own. Should they accommodate local 
terms to fit the Christian concept of God, or should they introduce Western 
terminology? This translational and linguistic problem leads to the question: 
are there universal concepts which (despite of cultural affiliation, based on the 
common human experience) could communicate the Christian idea of God? 
Findings of Wierzbicka, and her own claim is: yes – there are semantic primes, 
through which we  can translate our ideas (with minor imperfections). But 
this last question goes beyond the reach of mere secular linguistics, and enters 
the domain of theology. For it is theological claim that in our human nature 
we are capable of addressing Triune God.
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In his speech on Areopagus the Apostle Paul said to the crowd, that 
he sees that they are religious people, and that they have even erected 
pedestal dedicated to  “Unknown God” (agnosto theo). He  continues 
to say: “To Whom then, you are ignorantly devout, This One am I an-
nouncing to  you” (Acts 17:23). We  can say, therefore, that Paul was 
not attached strictly to the terminology of naming God, when he was 
spreading the teaching of Jesus Christ. The pagan devotees may be po-
tentially, unknowingly, giving honour to the one and real God. Charles 
M. Stang considers that Paul may be anticipating Dionysian notion 
“that the unknown and unknowable God can only be properly known 
through unknowing.”1 In  the Apostle’s statement we  can find the 
dominant Christian idea that language, words, do  not precisely cor-
respond with metaphysical reality. They are, to  some degree, relative. 
The concept of God is fundamental for explaining the Christian doc-
trine. Without it, it  is obviously impossible to  explain fundamentals 
of Christianity: the Trinity, Christ, Revelation, protology, eschatology 
etc. If there is no basic understanding of the concept of God everything 
falls apart. The predominant opinion was that in every culture there 
is some rudimentary even primitive concept of God, which can serve 
as preparatio evangelica. This seemed to work for the first ages of Chris-
tianity when missionaries, following Paul, were not arguing with basic 
linguistic concepts.
Anna Wierzbicka, world-renowned Polish linguist, in her work Jak 
można mówić o Trójcy Świętej w słowach prostych i uniwersalnych [How 
can one talk about the Holy Trinity in simple and universal words?] states 
that today the problem of language for theologians is one of the greatest 
1 He continues: “Paul therefore emerges from this speech as  the very first ad-
vocate of Dionysian unknowing, the authoritative apostolic witness to the goal of all 
saying and unsaying.” Ch. M. Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity in Dionysius the Are- 
opagite: “No longer I”, Oxford 2012, p. 142.
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challenges.2 This is why she decided to translate traditional theological 
concepts so that they can be universally understood. For that purpose 
she uses Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM),3 consisting of seman-
tic primes, irreducible language concepts, common to all human expe-
rience. Wierzbicka recognizes the plurality of human languages and 
its correlation with human ways of thinking. This is why NSM situates 
itself on the side of linguistic relativism.4
This undertaking is, without a  doubt, controversial and daring. 
In  the history of Christianity we can see that many of  the doctrinal 
conflicts, if not most of them, were in fact the aftermath of problems 
with language, translations, usage specific words. This is why we can 
trace the Christian debate on language to the first centuries. One of the 
first serious debates involved the Cappadocian Fathers and Eunomians. 
Eunomius adopted the rule of strict correspondence between the struc-
ture of being and structure of  language. Basil the Great in  tractatus 
De Spiritu Sancto wrote about their theory:
They have an old sophism, invented by Aetius, the champion of this 
heresy, in  one of  whose Letters there is  a  passage to  the effect that 
things naturally unlike are expressed in unlike terms, and, conversely, 
that things expressed in unlike terms are naturally unlike.5
2 Cf. A. Wierzbicka, Jak można mówić o Trójcy Świętej w słowach prostych i uni- 
wersalnych, Lublin 2004, p. 9.
3 NSM was developed by Wierzbicka and Cliff Goddard, but the origin of this 
concept can be dated as  far as  17th century. Both authors write: “As 17th-century phi-
losophers like Arnauld, Descartes, Locke, Pascal, and Leibniz saw clearly, the only 
way to immunize the metalanguage of semantic description against circularity and/or 
infinite regress is to base it on a finite inventory of primitive terms.” And only Leibniz, 
they explain, had required methodology – analysing extremely large number of defi-
nitions, to find out which of  the words could be “elementary building blocks” from 
which all complex concepts can be built. The project was taken up in 1960s by Polish 
semanticist Andrzej Bogusławski. C. Goddard, A. Wierzbicka, Lexical Semantics Across 
Domains, Languages and Cultures, Oxford 2014, p. 11.
4 Cf. P. Blumczyński, Turning the Tide: A Critique of Natural Semantic Metalan-
guage from a Translation Studies Perspective, Translation Studies 6 (2013) no. 3, p. 263.
5 Basil the Great, De Spiritu Sancto, II, 4, in: Ph. Schaff, H. Wace (eds.), A Se-
lect Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church [Second Series], 
vol. 8: Basil: Letters and Selected Works, trans. rev. B. Jackson, Peabody 1995, p. 4.
Piotr Popiołek120
The problem of  language is  fundamental for theologians, and al-
though Wierzbicka states that today it  is specifically current, it  was 
always inscribed in  theological deliberations. There is  no doubt that 
in contemporary globalized world the problem of language occurs with 
greater intensity than before, on an unprecedented scale.
Is it possible to speak about Christian God using universal catego-
ries – semantic primes? In her work she gives translation of Catholic 
Credo into the language of semantic primes. I consider this the point 
where theology specifically meets linguistics. Are the categories and 
formulas used by  Wierzbicka sufficient, and are they even possible 
to communicate such complex concepts as God? I argue that this is not 
merely linguistic question but theological and metaphysical. If we look 
at the sources of Christian doctrinal debates we can see that the ques-
tion of  language, its sufficiency to describe theological concepts, was 
very often, at the very least, implicitly at the centre of those debates.
Language of Christianity
There are many languages in which there is no corresponding words 
for which are found in  Christian terminology. Wierzbicka lists few 
of them: Trinity, sacrifice, mercy, neighbour, sin, grace.6 This is of course 
just a  small part of  the rich theological language. We  could extend 
this list almost indefinitely, adding concepts like: God, spirit, person, 
being, omnipotence, etc. Those concepts seem to be crucial for the un-
derstanding of Christian doctrine as they are present in the synodical 
formulas.
In Christianity there is  no sacred language. There is  no one cho-
sen language for revelation as there is for example in Islam, where the 
Quran was revealed in Arabic, and every translation of the revelation 
is considered a mere paraphrase of the original sacred script.7 In Chris-
tian Revelation there is only one Word – who is the living Christ. This 
6 Cf. A. Wierzbicka, Jak można mówić o Trójcy Świętej, p. 8.
7 “The Quranic revelation in a sense ‘shattered’ the Arabic language and trans-
formed it into the sacred language that it is for Muslims. It created a work whose lan-
guage is inimitable and considered miraculous, a book that is believed to be untrans-
latable. The sacred presence and theophanic reality of the Quran as well as the levels 
of meaning contained in  its verses cannot be  rendered into another language, even 
Persian and other Islamic languages that were themselves deeply influenced by  the 
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is why Christianity is so fertile when it comes to intercultural encoun-
ters. All humanity is called to communion with God, and no language 
or culture in  itself is a barrier for this vocation, for they are product 
of man’s nature. There shouldn’t be any inherent cognitive impossibility 
to receive the Word of God. In the ancient Church there was a presup-
position, mostly biblical, that there is no nation that could not worship 
God. John Paul II in Slavorum Apostoli wrote that this “vision of catho-
licity of the Church [is] like a symphony of the various liturgies in all 
the world’s languages united in one single liturgy.”8
 Theological terminology is formed in specific cultural and histori-
cal context. Specific theological concepts have their own Sitz im Leb-
en. Many of theological terms and concepts are taken from everyday 
life. Although with time this language becomes formalized and rigid. 
Some of the terms become sanctioned and are regarded authoritative 
over others. This process takes places during numerous theological de-
bates and is verified throughout synodical teaching, and the authority 
of  prominent theologians and saints. After centuries some elements 
of this language may seem inaccurate, obsolete or anachronistic. Many 
of the key concepts lose their original meaning becoming unintelligible 
in  a new milieu. Taking for example the concept of  “person,” which 
is fundamental for understanding the Christian doctrines of the Trinity 
and Christology, its popular meaning nowadays is very different. Polish 
theologian Grzegorz Strzelczyk remarked that contemporary concept 
of person indicates individual being, which possess self-consciousness 
and freedom.9 Therefore, this understanding of  the person is  consid-
erably quite different than that which dominated when the dogmatic 
definitions were taking shape. A  person wasn’t understood only in-
dividualistically, which is what is stressed nowadays in the dominant 
liberal discourse. It was characterized by its relational and communal 
significance (The aspect which is specifically important when it comes 
to  defining the trinitarian relations between Divine Hypostasis/Per-
sons). Consequently there is a situation where concept of the person 
used in theology is mostly different than the concept of person which 
is used in popular discourse and colloquial language.
Quranic Arabic.” S. Hossein Nasr et al. (eds.), The Study Quran: New Translation and 
Commentary, New York 2015, p. 55.
8 John Paul II, Slavorum Apostoli, Rome 1985, V, 17.
9 G. Strzelczyk, Teraz Jezus: na tropach żywej chrystologii, Warszawa 2007, p. 114.
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Christian Philosophy of Language
Let us consider one of the first linguistic conflicts in early Christianity. 
Debating with Eunomians, who could be called the “linguistic univer-
salists” of the IV century, Gregory of Nyssa in his Letter to Eustathius 
draws attention to the insufficiency of names when naming reality, and 
especially God. He notes that the Eunomians “bring the appellation 
of Godhead to be an  indication of nature.”10 “But the Divine nature 
itself, as it is, remains unexpressed by all the names that are conceived 
for it, as our doctrine declares.”11
He shows that it  is impossible for the names to  indicate a differ-
ent nature accordingly. It would mean that to each of God’s attributes: 
beneficent, judge, good, just, there would be different definition which 
would mean each distinct nature. Gregory states that: “Indeed the sub-
stance is one thing which no definition has been found to express, and 
the significance of  the names employed concerning it  varies, as  the 
names are given from some operation or accident.”12
According to Gregory, the Godhead is  a  name “derived from op-
eration,” but the appellation of Godhead is not necessarily indications 
of nature. He uses scriptural argument by referring to Exodus 7:1 when 
it  says that Moses is  “as a god to Pharaoh.” If we had to use Euno-
mian logic, that would mean that the Moses’s very nature is divine. This 
is why the Godhead should be derived from action. Godhead is un-
definable in  its nature. In  his letter to  Ablabius he  gives etymology 
of the name God – θεός, being the name of three divine Hypostasis. 
Accordingly the name God derives from “one of these that operation 
of surveying and inspection, or, as one might call it, beholding, whereby 
He surveys all things and overlooks them all, discerning our thoughts, 
and even entering by His power of  contemplation into those things 
which are not visible.”13 Godhead, or θεότης, therefore “is so called from 
10 Gregory of Nyssa, On the Holy Trinity, in: Ph. Schaff, H. Wace (eds.), A Se-
lect Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church [Second Series], 
vol.  5: Gregory of Nyssa: Dogmatic Treatises, etc., trans. W. Moore, H. Austin Wilson, 
Peabody 1995, p. 329.
11 Gregory of Nyssa, On the Holy Trinity, p. 329.
12 Gregory of Nyssa, On the Holy Trinity, p. 329.
13 Gregory of Nyssa, On “Not Three Gods”, in: Ph. Schaff, H. Wace (eds.), A Se-
lect Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church [Second Series], 
vol. 5, p. 333.
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θέα, or beholding, and that He who is our θεατής or beholder.”14 To-
masz Grodecki notes that “the term God is a purely human creation 
and has a basis in God only as long as He gives us the knowledge of his 
actions.”15 The names are purely conventional, and are not indicative 
of the true nature of things they are referring to. Those names some-
times can be abstract and made up – it is a matter of convention. This 
is the essence of Gregory’s “philosophy of language.” The names do not 
imply the ontological status of beings. Grodecki writes that:
Man having the power (dynamis) of the reason, which he can use ac-
cording to his will (exousia) performs the activity (energeia) of naming 
things. All the names are therefore conventional terms, words describ-
ing some particular subject. Their origin is, however, purely human, 
they are constructs of human reason and of human cognition of things, 
and express the essence of certain things, as long, as man can know it. 
They are, therefore, not their specific names, but names given to them 
by people. Moreover, they do not necessarily have anything to do with 
the nature of things. Words signify things not so much defining them, 
but rather being their symbols, signs directing the thought of man to-
wards them.16
It does not mean, that this kind of  linguistic relativism was and 
is widely accepted in the Church. From Contra Celsum we know, that 
Celsus was himself radical advocate of linguistic relativism. In book I,  
Origen cites Celsus: “It makes no  difference whether the God who 
is  over all things be  called by  the name of  Zeus, which is  current 
among the Greeks, or by that, e.g., which is in use among the Indians 
or Egyptians.”17 (I, 24). Origen argues against Celsus, stating that the 
names, depending in which language they are pronounced, correspond 
to a certain reality – it is due to magical practices, rituals and liturgy. 
Names, according to  him, “possess the great power”: “He, therefore, 
14 Gregory of Nyssa, On “Not Three Gods”.
15 T.  Grodecki, Wprowadzenie, in: Grzegorz z  Nyssy, Drobne pisma trynitarne, 
Kraków 2004, p. 20.
16 T. Grodecki, Wprowadzenie, p. 20–21.
17 Origen, Against Celsus,  II. 4,  trans. Rev. F.  Crombie, D.D., in: Ph. Schaff, 
H. Wace (eds.), The Ante-Nicene Fathers: Translations of the Writings of the Fathers down 
to A.D. 325, vol. 4: Tertullian, part fourth; Minucius Felix; Commodian; Origen, parts first 
and second, Peabody 1995, p. 406.
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who has a nobler idea, however small, of these matters, will be careful 
not to apply differing names to different things.”18
The Greek term Theos indicated a predicate, but not a  specific in-
dividual.19 There was no question of adapting this term for Christian 
discourse. Although Gregory stated that language is conventional and 
that terms do not indicate the nature of named things, sometimes the 
Church maintained more universalistic view on  language. Especially 
when some terms from the theological vocabulary became solidified, 
becoming much more difficult to change and translate.
Christian Concept of God –  
Dialogue with the Far East
This problem became visible particularly from the 16th century, when 
Catholic missionaries came into contact with new cultures and nations, 
who had not encountered Christianity until then. That was a  chal-
lenge for missionaries, who had to  explain new concepts in  totally 
different cultural, linguistic, and intellectual environment. The ques-
tion arose of possibilities of  the adaptation of  local terms. In China 
Matteo Ricci tried to appropriate name Tianzhu, Lord of Heaven, and 
Shangdi, Lord of High. The term Tian, Heaven, was too semantically 
burdened to be used. The term Shangdi was dismissed as well, and mis-
sionaries had stuck to Tianzhu, which was an original name, not used 
in Chinese classical and religious literature. This term originated from 
Michele Ruggieri, and Ricci kept it  in use. This term, which is  still 
in  use today among Chinese Catholics, was still a  matter of  discus-
sion and Franciscans and Dominicans were opposed to using native 
terminologies. They maintained that Chinese names for God, as well 
as  Chinese rites honouring the ancestors were against the Catho-
lic teaching. It was proposed to use the Latin transliteration instead 
as a safe solution to the problem20. A similar strategy was presumably 
used by first Christian missionaries to China from Eastern Assyrian 
Church, commonly called the Nestorian Church. From scarce sources, 
18 Origen, Against Celsus, II. 4, p. 406.
19 T. Grodecki, Wprowadzenie, p. 19f.
20 Cf. A. C. Hosne, The Jesuit Missions to China and Peru, 1570–1610: Expectations 
and Appraisals of Expansionism, New York 2013, p. 154.
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like the Nestorian Stele from Chang’an we  know that for the term 
for God was used phonetic transcription of Syriac Elohim in Chinese 
characters: A-luo-he. What is interesting, the first two characters, a-luo, 
were also used in Buddhist terminology: a-luo-han, which meant Arhat 
[someone who has attained the goal of religious life].21
In Japan in 16th century, as we have mentioned, there was a problem 
similar to that in China. First, there was a problem of terminological 
misconception when Francis Xavier first visited Japan and used name 
Dainichi as the equivalent of Christian God. It created the false con-
viction among the Japanese that Christianity was but another Buddhist 
sect due to that Dainichi Nyorai was Buddha Mahavairocana of the 
Shingon sect.22 In 1555 Melchor Nunes Barreto, Jesuit provincial to In-
dia and Japan issued policy to use Latin and Portuguese languages for 
Christian names. But as Ikuo Higashibaba notes it did not totally ex-
clude the use of native names, e.g. Tentō (The Heavenly Way).23 Tentō 
was popular Confucian term used as an alternative for Deus. Moreover 
Latin-Portuguese-Japanese dictionary published in  1603 listed also 
names as Tenson: Word used in churches for Deos that is, the Lord of Heav-
en and Tentei: Tȇno micado. King. Also, Deos.24 The Christian concept 
of God introduced the original idea of the one creator unknown in lo-
cal thought. This idea of creator of the world was unique and difficult 
to understand for the Japanese, as Higashibaba noted.25 This originality 
of  Christian idea of  God was the reason why cautious missionaries 
preferred not to mingle the Christian concept with the native ones. The 
term Deusu became commonly used among Japanese Christians (called 
kirishitan), so that it was even used in anti-Christian literature of early-
modern Japan. The name was also deliberately distorted and became 
dai uso – “the great lie.”26
21 Cf. P. Y. Saeki, The Nestorian Monument in China, London–New York–Toronto 
1928, p. 188.
22 G.  Elison, Deus Destroyed: The Image of  Christianity in  Early Modern Japan, 
Harvard University 1988, p. 33.
23 Cf. I. Higashibaba, Christianity in Early Modern Japan: Kirishitan Belief and 
Practice, Boston–Leiden–Köln 2001, p. 39. 
24 Doi Tadao et al. (ed. and trans.), Hōyaku Nippo jisho, Tokyo 1980, p. 647 cited 
in I. Higashibaba, Christianity in Early Modern Japan, p. 87.
25 Cf. I. Higashibaba, Christianity in Early Modern Japan, p. 88.
26 G. Elison, Deus Destroyed, p. 36.
Piotr Popiołek126
The dominant idea became that some terminology can’t be accom-
modated. It showed that there are concepts which cannot be substituted 
with native names because their definitions are too far apart. We can see 
why missionaries decided to keep the phonetic notation of the West-
ern terms. This strategy took over whole theological discourse, so that 
other crucial concepts were in this way “translated” to Japanese: anima, 
spiritus, baptismo, inferno, paraiso, etc. This may seem as a linguistic ca-
pitulation and a testament to the missionary inability to use the full 
potential of newly learned languages. In contrast to the genius of Ricci, 
who himself stated: “rather than attacking what they [the Chinese] say, 
we prefer to twist it around so it will fit the idea of God,”27 their ca-
pabilities to accommodate foreign language for the need of spreading 
Christianity seem to be totally fallow.
God – Seeking for the Semantic Primes
For two millennia of  Christianity there were many debates regard-
ing the concept of God and proper way of addressing Him. Contrary 
to some theories, like that of Wilhelm Schmidt’s “primitive monothe-
ism” maintaining that the concept of one powerful being is common for 
the all tribal peoples, the idea of Christian God is sometimes so distant 
that the accommodation of existing native terms is considered trouble-
some for theologians.
Anna Wierzbicka tries to  overcome this problem. Based on  her 
longstanding semantic research she claims that there is  a  basic set 
of universal concepts present in all languages and cultures. All other 
concepts can be reduced to those fundamentals, semantic primes. Those 
are irreducible to any other primes, and can’t be described by them. This 
is why they are considered to be universal for human language. This set 
of sixty words and terms was collected and listed by Wierzbicka and 
Goddard in the Meaning and Universal Grammar Theory and Empirical 
Findings in 2002. The list below presents English translation of those 
concepts.
1. substantives: I, YOU, SOMEONE, PEOPLE, SOMETHING/THING, BODY
2. determiners: THIS, THE SAME, OTHER
27 Quoted in: A. C. Hosne, The Jesuit Missions to China and Peru, p. 152.
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 3. quantifiers: ONE, TWO, MUCH/MANY, SOME, ALL
 4. evaluators and descriptors: GOOD, BAD, BIG, SMALL
 5. mental predicates: THINK, KNOW, WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR
 6. speech: SAY, WORDS, TRUE
 7. actions, events, movement: DO, HAPPEN, MOVE
 8. existence, possession: THERE IS, HAVE
 9. life and death: LIVE, DIE
10. logical concepts: NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF
11. time: WHEN/TIME, NOW, BEFORE, AFTER, A LONG TIME, A SHORT  
 TIME, FOR SOME TIME, MOMENT
12. space: WHERE/PLACE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR, SIDE, INSIDE
13. intensifier and augmentor: VERY, MORE
14. taxonomy and partonomy: KIND OF, PART
15. similarity:  LIKE
This undertaking may indeed seem utopian. Umberto Eco in his 
work The Search for Perfect Language describes the history of attempts 
to create a universal language that could be used by all people of dif-
ferent cultures.28 These artificial, a posteriori languages, such as Espe-
ranto or Volapük, called the International Auxiliary Languages, usually 
died in  the process which Eco calls “Babelization,” that is, breaking 
down of this language into local language subgroups as a result of at-
tempts to  update and improve it.29 All these undertakings, however, 
relied on the creation of a universal language that could be used by all 
of humanity, ignoring the fact that they were created in a European 
context. What Wierzbicka does is not such a naive undertaking. The 
board of universal concepts she co-created as an auxiliary tool is meant 
to be a kind of Rosetta Stone, allowing to bring down certain names, 
words that exist in a given language of culture, let’s say “A” to the basic 
words, and from them back to another language natural “B”. Moreover, 
the selection of  semantic primes was preceded by  thorough linguis-
tic research and language analysis. It is not a posteriori language. Eco 
doubts the existence of such a parameter language which would allow 
tertium comparationis.30 Wierzbicka’s overwhelming advantage is  that 
she does not try to create a universal a posteriori language, but creates 
28 U. Eco, The Search for Perfect Language, trans. J. Fentress, Oxford 1995.
29 Cf. U. Eco, The Search for Perfect Language, p. 319.
30 Cf. U. Eco, The Search for Perfect Language, p. 346.
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a small dictionary of universal concepts, based on empirical research 
and the analysis of a large number of natural languages.
Let us now return to the main point of our interest: the Christian 
concept of God, which could be expressed in universal metalanguage. 
The definition is constructed based on the semantic primes mentioned 
previously:31
GOD
is someone not someone like people
this someone is someone good
if this someone wants something to happen, it is something good
if this someone wants something to do, it is something good
if this someone wants something to do, this someone can do it
all things there are, because this someone wants it to be
there are people, because this someone wants them to be
this someone wants people to be, because this someone wants to do 
good things to people
there is one this someone, there are no more this someone
The first problem with this definition constructed in NSM is ques-
tion of its universality.32 Wierzbicka knows that every translation is in 
some way a betrayal.33 No translation is perfect, and every transition 
of  certain concepts to  another language is  burdened with marginal 
mistakes. As the example of the problem of acculturation of Christian-
ity in East Asia showed, some translations bear heavy consequences. 
It  is impossible to  ignore cultural context and using dead dictionary 
definitions to  translate complicated ideas – like the idea of one, om-
nipotent God and Creator. The most obvious equivalents can may be in 
fact dangerously misleading. On the other hand, holding on to foreign, 
31 Cf. A. Wierzbicka, Jak można mówić o Trójcy Świętej, p.  17. Similar attempt 
is seen in her work What Did Jesus Mean? Explaining the Sermon on the Mount and The 
Parables in Simple and Universal Human Concepts, New York 2001, p. 20–21, where she 
outlines the idea of God which is seen in the Jesus’ Sermon on the mount.
32 Piotr Blumczyński briefly address this problem: “The difficulty of  handling 
complex concepts in translation and the practical inadequacy of context-free diction-
ary equivalents in actual texts are so commonly recognised that they do not deserve any 
elaboration.” P. Blumczyński, Turning the Tide, p. 264.
33 A. Wierzbicka, Semantics, Culture, and Cognition: Universal Human Concepts 
in Culture-Specific Configurations, New York–Oxford 1992, p. 7.
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abstract terms may lead to misunderstandings, giving the impression 
of its enigmatic and secretive nature34 – as it was with Latin and Portu-
guese words transliterated phonetically to Japanese. In long run it led 
to  incomprehensibility of  this terms by  the local Christians, Kirishi-
tan, who, after the expulsion of  Christian missionaries, maintained 
the practice of praying in those languages, but were unaware of their 
meaning, as well as of the concept of Deusu, Santa Maria, etc.35 This 
shows that attachment to certain words and definitions representing 
the concepts may bear the cost of their comprehension, when the con-
text is lost (in the sense of geography or diachronically, when cultural 
shifts happen over time). NSM tries to omit many of  those problems. 
By reducing definition of God to the universal primes Wierzbicka tries 
to minimize the backlash of  translational “betrayal,” reducing misun-
derstanding to  a  minimum. Language reflects human interpretation 
of the world, how they see the world, not reality itself – this position 
is in accord with predominant orthodox Christian view on the nature 
of language. Eunomian ultra-realism, stating that language reflects re-
ality, indicating the substance of things, was found to be heretical. If we 
agree that language is  conventional construct and it  reflects “human 
conceptualization, human interpretation of the world” we must further 
ask, after Blumczyński, “Does conceptualization vary from one speak-
er to another, from one human conceptualizer to another?”36 Answer 
is obviously – yes. Every speaker, even of the same language, using the 
same word may be referring to a different concept. This is why context 
of the spoken language is crucial. This is no more a matter of text but 
also of lived situations. Defining complex concepts through dictionary 
terminology is not sufficient. Christianity, as it was stated before, is not 
based on text, it is not “religion of the Book,” rather a religion of the 
Living Word – a God-man Jesus called Christ. It  is religion of  per-
sonal relationship with this Person together with His Father through 
34 Further reading on this topic: P. Nosco, Secrecy and the Transmission of Tradi-
tion: Issues in the Study of the “Underground” Christians, Japanese Journal of Religious 
Studies 20 (2003) no. 1, p. 3–29.
35 See: I. Higashibaba, Christianity in Early Modern Japan; S. Turnbull, Kakure 
Kirishitan of Japan: A Study of Their Development, Beliefs and Rituals to the Present Day, 
London–New York 1998; P. Nosco, Secrecy and the Transmission of Tradition; Ch. Whelan, 
The Beginning of Heaven and Earth: The Sacred Book of  Japan’s Hidden Christians, Ho-
nolulu 1996.
36 P. Blumczyński, Turning the Tide, p. 265.
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the Holy Spirit. This is why a simple translation of the fundamental 
Christian concepts will be in vain, if they will not be experienced in the 
community of Church. Some ideas, e.g. as the one of the God – the 
one creator can be difficult to grasp even if explained precisely. What 
enables someone to share the same view of the world, of understand-
ing these concepts is not mere being part of community speaking one 
language, but a way of living.
Conclusions
Getting back to the fundamental question: what does the word “God” 
mean? We know that different communities have different concepts 
of  “God,” “gods,” which are not necessarily translatable. There is  al-
ways to some extent “betrayal” of those concepts, a lack of clarity out-
side of a particular milieu of  shared community. The concept of  this 
“someone” is not limited to “who He  is,” but rather how does He af-
fect your life, and what is  your response. In  this speculations there 
is very thin border between linguistics and theology, because language, 
from a theological perspective is not a purely secular domain. In this 
manner, theologically speaking, it should be assumed that all human 
languages are in some way preconditioned to be able to embrace the 
Christian concept of  God. A  concept which is  not mere theoretical 
and philosophical construct, but which is immersed in a very specific 
history.
Literature
Basil the Great, De Spiritu Sancto, in: Ph. Schaff, H. Wace (eds.), A Select Li-
brary of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church [Second 
Series], vol. 8: Basil: Letters and Selected Works, trans. rev. B.  Jackson, Pea-
body 1995, p. 1–50.
Blumczyński P., Turning the Tide: A Critique of Natural Semantic Metalanguage 
from a  Translation Studies Perspective, Translation Studies 6  (2013) no. 3, 
p. 261–276.
Eco U., The search for perfect language, trans. J. Fentress, Oxford 1995.
Elison G., Deus Destroyed: The Image of  Christianity in  Early Modern Japan, 
Cambridge–London 1988.
Naming God: Christian Philosophy of Language… 131
Gregory of Nyssa, On “Not Three Gods”, in: Ph. Schaff, H. Wace (eds.), A Select 
Library of  the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of  the Christian Church [Sec-
ond Series], vol. 5: Gregory of Nyssa: Dogmatic Treatises, etc., trans. W. Moore, 
H. Austin Wilson, Peabody 1995, p. 331–336.
Gregory of Nyssa, On the Holy Trinity, in: Ph. Schaff, H. Wace (eds.), A Select 
Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church [Second 
Series], vol. 5: Gregory of Nyssa: Dogmatic Treatises, etc., trans. by W. Moore, 
H. Austin Wilson, Peabody 1995, p. 326–330.
Grodecki T., Wprowadzenie, in: Grzegorz z  Nyssy, Drobne pisma trynitarne, 
Kraków 2004.
Higashibaba I., Christianity in Early Modern Japan: Kirishitan Belief and Prac-
tice, Boston–Leiden–Köln 2001.
Hosne A. C., The Jesuit Missions to China and Peru, 1570–1610: Expectations and 
Appraisals of Expansionism, New York 2013.
Hossein Nasr S. et al. (eds.), The Study Quran: New Translation and Commen-
tary, New York 2015.
John Paul II, Slavorum Apostoli, Rome 1985.
Nosco P., Secrecy and the Transmission of  Tradition: Issues in  the Study of  the 
“Underground” Christians, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 20 (2003) 
no. 1, p. 3–29.
Origen, Against Celsus,  II. 4,  trans. rev. F.  Crombie, D.D. in: Ph. Schaff, 
H. Wace (eds.), The Ante-Nicene Fathers: Translations of the Writings of the 
Fathers down to A.D. 325, vol. 4: Tertullian, part fourth; Minucius Felix; Com-
modian; Origen, parts first and second, Peabody 1995, p. 395–669.
Saeki P. Y., The Nestorian Monument in China, London–New York–Toronto 
1928.
Stang C. M., Apophasis and Pseudonymity in Dionysius the Areopagite: “No lon-
ger i”, Oxford 2012.
Strzelczyk G., Teraz Jezus: na tropach żywej chrystologii, Warszawa 2007.
Turnbull S., Kakure Kirishitan of Japan: A Study of Their Development, Beliefs 
and Rituals to the Present Day, London–New York 1998.
Whelan C., The Beginning of Heaven and Earth: The Sacred Book of Japan’s Hid-
den Christians, Honolulu 1996.
Wierzbicka A., Goddard C., Lexical Semantics Across Domains, Languages and 
Cultures, Oxford 2014.
Wierzbicka A., Jak można mówić o Trójcy Świętej w słowach prostych i uniwer-
salnych, Lublin 2004.
Wierzbicka A., Semantics, Culture, and Cognition: Universal Human Concepts 
in Culture-Specific Configurations, New York–Oxford 1992.
Piotr Popiołek132
Wierzbicka A., What Did Jesus Mean? Explaining the Sermon on the Mount and 
The Parables in Simple and Universal Human Concepts, New York 2001.
